The transmission of safety information is an essential part of a railway signalling system. What is a railway signal but a device for sending information to a train driver to tell him that it is safe to proceed? Originally semaphore arms, signals now generally take the form of coloured lights, and it is starting to become common for the information giving authority for the train to proceed to be transmitted by radio to produce a display in the driver's cab. Figure 1 shows a state-of-the-art signalling system where there are no lineside signals and vital data giving authority for train movements is transmitted to the train by radio. A fixed data link, which may use optical fibres or copper conductors for its transmission medium, transmits command and status data between lineside equipment and the control centre, and a speech link is also provided by radio between the signaller and the train driver. This system architecture is typical of that adopted for the European Train Control System (ETCS), for which a European standard has been developed to harmonise functionality, message formats, transmission protocols, etc, so as to ensure interoperability across the European railway network.
A high integrity (typically SIL 4) programmable control system known as an interlocking 1 (see Figure 1 ) ensures that commands authorising the train to move, or moving points to set a route for the movement of a train are sent only when it is safe to do so, but reliance is placed on the integrity of the data transmission systems to ensure that incorrect, out of date, or misrouted messages are not received by the train or the lineside equipment. In applications of the ETCS system it is usual to have a separate high integrity controller known as the Radio Block Centre (RBC) to manage the transmission of the vital information. The on-board train control and data transmission functions are performed by a further high-integrity processor unit.
It is a design feature of all the parts of the system that in the event of loss of data transmission the receiving equipment will revert to a safe state. Thus if the train ceases receiving regular update commands from the interlocking a stop command will be displayed to the driver and the brakes will automatically be applied. This paper sets out the theoretical background which has led to development of standards for the transmission of safety-related data which have enabled the introduction transmission-based railway signalling and train control systems.
History and Theoretical Background
Although railway signal engineering has something of a reputation for conservatism, interest in the use of digital data transmission using serial data links, including the possibility was stimulated by economic forces during the 1970's due to the high cost of providing individual point-to-point control circuits for every signal and other item of lineside equipment distributed over wide areas.
The International Union of Railways (UIC) set up a study group to produce recommendations for how safety could be ensured with this change in technology. This group produced a series of recommendations which have since been developed further into a European Standard, EN 50159.
The theoretical framework used the conceptual model in Figure 2 The following points should be noted about the model:
• The safety concept model is generalised from the OSI multilevel model.
• Any level in the model can itself be sub-divided into several levels.
• Any level in the model may contain memory.
• The sequence in which the elements of the model appear can • The nature of the physical link depends on the application.
• The link could be part of a closed or open network.
• Although many standards and recommendations for the transmission of information exist (e.g. CCITT) these may not cover the effects of equipment faults on safety.
• Standards exist for some sources of error (e.g. EMC standards) bur these do not generally cover the effects of equipment faults.
• A closed loop may exist at several levels of the system.
• Each element in the model will introduce a delay in the transmission of information. The maximum acceptable delay depends on the application.
The Influence of Errors in Transmission Systems
For an ideal link, IS = IR Where IS = information fed from source IR = information received by receiver However, all real systems are subject to error, so that the received information is a function of the sent information and any errors which might have been injected: IR = ƒ(IS, E) (E ≠ 0) Where E is a summation of errors from all sources The characteristic required of a transmission system for safety information is then IR = IS when E = 0 IR = F when E ≠ 0 Where F causes the process using the information to go to a safe state.
To achieve this, the system needs to contain a decision function of the form shown in Figure 3 , or more generally a number of such functions at different levels.
Some examples of decision sets:
• All physical signals above a certain amplitude or within a certain frequency band
• Digital data which satisfies particular coding rules • Messages which satisfy certain protocols, e.g. have correct addresses or valid time stamps.
In practice there are two limitations to the effectiveness of the decision function:
• Values of ƒ(IS, E) for E≠0 may exist which are members of the decision set
• The decision element itself may be defective These limitations define the achievable safety.
Sources and Nature of Error

Error sources
The type of decision function needed to ensure the safety of the transmitted information depends on the sources of error to which the transmission system may be exposed and on the nature of the errors which may be produced. Error sources may be divided into three broad classes:
• Inherent characteristics, error generated by sources within the transmission system (e.g. thermal noise in resistors)
• External influences (the electromagnetic environment), errors injected from sources outside the system, generally referred to as electromagnetic interference (EMI)
• Equipment failure, errors which are solely the result of equipment failure within the system.
Relevant levels in the conceptual model
Errors due to either to inherent characteristics of components or to the influence of the electromagnetic environment are more likely to be inected at the lower levels of the conceptual model in Figure 2 , examples being noise in amplifiers and modems, EMI from power systems or machinery, and cross-talk from other transmission systems.
The effects of internal noise sources or external influences can be greatly intensified by the consequences of equipment failure. Defects as simple as high-resistance contacts can create high levels of noise, and loss of continuity in screening conductors, or the presence of stray earth connections, can greatly increase the level of external interference coupled into the system.
Errors due solely to equipment failure* without any any other source of noise or interference tend to be more important at the higher levels, such as protocols, addressing, coding and decoding. Errors from external influences can also occur at higher levels, e.g. EMI coupled into equipment via the power supply.
Communication can be interrupted by failure at any level of the model and of course leads to a serious loss of function, but the extent to which this affects safety depends on the application. Railway signalling and train control systems are usually designed so that loss of communiation causes trains to stop, which is normally a safe state.
*Equipment failure should be taken to include hardware and software failure in components or subsystems of the transmission system.
The Electromagnetic Environment
Any part of the system is at all times enveloped in a complex pattern of electromagnetic fields which come from the external error sources mentioned in the previous slides. This electromagnetic environment is created by a wide variety of sources: electrical machinery, power transmission lines, natural phenomena such as lightning, radio transmitters, electronic equipment and vehicle ignition systems to name but a few 
(IS, E) at the point in the transmission at which the decision function is implemented
The electromagnetic environment for railway signalling systems tends to be dominated by the proximity of the overhead catenary or third rail power distribution arrangments of electric railway traction systems.
The electromagnetic environment changes from place to place and is time varying. New sources of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) with new characteristics continue to appear as technology changes -new types of radio communication, new types of electric traction on railways.
As more and more electrical and electronic products and system come into conformity with the standards supporting the European Directive on electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) it becomes more possible to rely on the EC compliance marking of equipment as an assurance that it will work correctly in the electromagnetic environment. However, EMC standards do not usually take account of the possibility of equipment failures which might increase the level of EMI or make the system more susceptible to existing levels of EMI. Thus when considering the safety of a transmission system it may be necessary to analyse the effect of possible failures even of equipment which has been certified against an EMC standard.
Error Distributions
It is important to remember that, although influences such as EMI are often treated as being random in nature, errors in transmitted information tend to be grouped into bursts 4 . This grouping of errors can reduce the effectiveness of error-detecting codes, as the probability of multiple errors occurring within one block or other unit of code can be greater by several orders of magnitude than might be estimated by assuming that errors were randomly distributed.
Pathological errors
Pathology is the study of disease. Pathological errors are those which occur when the transmission system is not in a healthy state. It may not always be practicable to rely on the mathematical techniques of coding and information theory to give assurance of safety with regard to pathological errors. Some examples of sources of such errors are listed below.
• Deterioration of the physical link or the associated transmitting and receiving can result in very high rates of error due to inherent sources or external influences.
• Cross-talk or co-channel interference from other transmission sysems can produce large numbers of errors with an informationlike structure.
• Synchronising errors, and the similar categories of data slips and framing errors produce long bursts of errors with an informationlike structure. Hardware failures or failures in the software or firmware of components of the transmission system can produce patterns of error which are too complex to be detected by coding techniques, or which may even systematically obey the coding rules but contain incorrect information.
• Human error on the part of maintenance staff has the potential to cause serious errors, for example by connecting transmission lines to the wrong circuits.
• Hackers or saboteurs may deliberately inject errors into the system.
Methods of Protecting Information
A multidimensional view of information
When considering methods of protecting information against errors it is useful to consider information as having four dimensions as illustrated in Figure 4 .
• Physical signal -within this dimension only the analogue value of the physical signal is considered.
• Data -in this dimension information is generally considered as strings of binary digits, and the relevant information protection techniques focus attention on the patterns of digits, without any consideration of useful content or meaning.
• Procedures -the information units considered are words consisting of groups of digits, but checks refer to protocol or syntax rather than meaning.
• Content -in this dimension the meaning of transmitted information is taken into account in checking its correctness. As information progresses from the lower to the higher levels of the model in Figure 2 the focus of interest tends to shift from the lower to the higher dimensions of Figure 4 .
Protection in the Physical Signal Dimension
Typical examples of protection applied to the physical signal are:
• Screening of cables and equipment housings • The use of balanced twisted conductors in copper cables • Suppression of interference at source • Use of optical fibres as a transmission medium
In older railway signalling applications it used to be common to transmit at what are for telecommunication engineers alarmingly high voltages on order to achieve low error rates by maintaining high signal-to-noise ratios. More recently the economic benefits of using standard telecommunications equipment and sharing transmission networks with other users have persuaded the signal engineers to abandon this practice.
The Data Dimension -Coding
Protection of transmitted information in the data dimension by the use of coding is based on the application of information theory as originated by Shannon5,6. An extremely condensed statement of the basic principle is that any code with information transmission rate Rt less than C and with length n can have arbitrarily small probability of decoding error P(e) defined by the inequality:
P(e) ≤ e -nE(Rt)
Figure 4: Multidimensional View of Information
Where E(Rt) is dependant on channel characteristics And E(Rt) > 0 for R < C Types of coding include:
• Repeat messages • Block coding • Convolution or cyclic block coding Repeat messages: The message is repeated n times and n identical copies have to be received for message to be treated as error free. This is potentially very effective against random errors but inefficient in terms of time and capacity. Block Codes 8, 9 :
The information encoder for a binary block code segments a source sequence into k-bit sequences and appends (n -k) redundant bits to each k-bit sequence for final transmission as n-bit data blocks. There are 2k different block sequences, each n bits long, defining a (n, k) block code. How to generate and implement these redundant bits such that the code has powerful and reliable error controlling performance is a major design concern.
Convolution or cyclic block codes 7 
:
The basis of this coding principle is to make the systematic n-bit combination in the previous slide of k information bits and (n -k) check bits cyclically complete according to specific mathematical algorithms called generating polynomials. The encoding method is to add as (n -k) least significant bits the remainder formed by dividing the n-bit combination of k most significant information bits and (n -k) "0"s by the (n -k) bit generator polynomial. The resulting combination is wholly divisible by the generator polynomial and the function of an error detecting receiver is to test for this.
Protection in the procedural dimension
Some examples of protection in the procedural dimension:
• Closed-loop protocols: receiver repeats message back to sender and awaits confirmation from sender before acting on message.
• Time stamping: message contains time of origin -receiver will reject information which is too old.
• Sender's address included in message -receiver will reject information from wrong sender, e.g. in the event of message routing errors or cross-talk.
Protection in the information content dimension
It is sometimes possible for the process which uses the received information to be able to detect errors. For example, it may be possible to check that parameters in the received information are within permitted ranges.
Where the transmitted information includes text messages to a human operator they may be able to recognise impossible instructions or nonsense words.
Standards
The theory and principles outlined above were developed by jointly by a number of European railways during the late 1970s and early 1980s and have subsequently been embodied in a European Standard:
BS EN 50191 Railway Applications -Communication, Signalling and Processing Systems Part 1: Safety related communications in closed transmission systems Part 2: Safety related communications in open transmission systems Although titled as a standard for railway applications there is little in the Standard which is specific to railways and it could be used with advantage for many other applications.
EN 50159 Part 1 -Closed Systems
This uses a model which is simpler than the conceptual model in Figure 2 of this paper but which can be mapped on to it. Its recommendations are consistent with the theory summarised in the earlier parts of this paper.
A closed system in this context is defined as one which has a fixed number or fixed maximum number of participants linked by a transmission system with well-known and fixed properties, and where the risk of unauthorized access is considered negligible.
EN 50159 Part 2 -Open Systems
An open transmission system is defined as one which transmission system with an unknown number of participants, having unknown, variable and non-trusted properties, used for unknown telecommunication services, and for which the risk of unauthorized access shall be assessed.
This part of the Standard concentrates mainly on what this paper calls "pathological" errors and protection in the procedural domain. It uses a similar model to that used in Part 1 of the Standard which can also be mapped on to the more detailed conceptual model of Figure 2 of this paper. It contains a useful classification of open systems but surprisingly does not mention radio.
Conclusion
This paper has given a brief summary of the principles followed in railway signalling and train control engineering to ensure the safety of information transmitted in applications for which a high level of safety integrity, typically SIL4, is essential.
Although there as yet only a handful of systems using a radio link to trains of the type shown in Figure 1 , many systems involving transmission of data over fixed links like the vital data link at the left hand side of Figure 1 have been brought into use in railways all over the world during the past 25 years. There are thousands of such installations worldwide with no instances of any accident resulting from error or corruption in the transmitted data.
The principles and techniques involved are not specific to railways and can be used with advantage in many other applications.
